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Introduction
I am doomed to eventually rape and then murder my poor little victims
to keep them from telling on me.'
So warned Larry Don McQuay, as he faced release from a Texas
prison this past April after serving six years of an eight-year sentence for
having sex with the six-year-old son of a former girlfriend.2 A self-de-
scribed "monster" and "scum of the earth" who claims to have molested
more than 240 children,3 McQuay begged state criminal justice officials to
castrate him to prevent further predatory behavior; instead, state officials
released him into the community under a host of conditions designed to
ensure that he would not come into contact with children.'
The McQuay case and others, most notably that of Jesse Timmen-
dequas, who raped and killed seven-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey,'
have inspired widespread legislative action to diminish the risk of predation
among sex offenders released from jail. "Megan's Laws," permitting local
law enforcement agencies to notify residents that a sexual predator has
moved into their community, now exist in thirty states.' The recent prolif-
eration of these statutes evidences escalating concern over the management
of sexual predators and has garnered the attention of the national media,7
1. Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Frees Child Molester Who Warns of New Crimes,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1996, at B7 (quoting Larry Don McQuay).
2. Bryan Denson, Drastic Measures; Castrate Me, Child Molester Says, Hous. POST,
June 5, 1994, at Al; Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Agrees to Surgery for a Molester, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1996, at A16.
3. Denson, supra note 2, at Al; Verhovek, supra note 2, at A16.
4. McQuay agreed to live in a locked facility and to wear electronic devices to allow
parole officers to monitor his whereabouts continually. Verhovek, supra note 1, at B7.
After initially denying McQuay's requests for castration on the ground that castration was
"elective surgery," the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles eventually consented to the
procedure, though the castration has not yet been carried out. Verhovek, supra note 2, at
A16.
5. Man Charged in 7-Year-Old Neighbor's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at B5.
6. Testimony of Congressman Dick Zimmer, House Subcomm. on Crime, Mar. 7,
1996, available in 1996 WL 117115. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:546(A) (West Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-17, -19
(Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-
106 (Supp. 1996).
7. See James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 64 (noting that growing number of states are enacting notification laws);
Jill Smolowe, Not in My Backyard: Citizens Rally to Keep Paroled Murderers and Sex
Offenders from Settling in Their Communities, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 59 (same).
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Congress,8 and President Clinton.9
However, the movement to protect society from the risks posed by
released sex offenders presents only half of the picture. During this Same
period, a growing number of states have passed laws designed to impede
the re-entry of these individuals into the community. Typically, such
"retention" statutes facilitate the involuntary commitment of sex offenders
to psychiatric hospitals after their criminal sentences have expired and until
such time as the offender has recovered from the mental condition that led
him'0 to engage in sexual misconduct. In some instances, however, an
8. In 1994, Congress passed its own version of Megan's Law, providing for manda-
tory registration of sex offenders with local law enforcement agencies and allowing the
dissemination of such information to interested members of the public. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (announcing "[d]uty of a State prison official or court... [to]
inform the [sexual predator] of the duty to register"); id. § 14071(d)(3) (stating that law
enforcement authorities "may release information that is necessary to protect the public
concerning a [sexual predator]") (emphasis added). In 1996, the statute was modified to
require the release of information to certain members of the community. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 14071(d)(2) (West 1996) (directing that law enforcement authorities "shall release
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a [sexual predator]") (emphasis
added).
9. After signing into law the mandatory community notification amendment to the
federal Megan's Law in May 1996, President Clinton vowed to fight to uphold such statutes
"all the way to the Supreme Court," noting that "there is no greater right than a parent's
right to raise a child in safety and love. Today, America warns: If you dare to prey on our
children, the law will follow you wherever you go, State to State, town to town." Remarks
on Signing Megan's Law and Exchange with Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 878
(May 17, 1996).
10. While no statute exempts women from its coverage, due to the historical paucity
of female sexual predators, I will not use inclusive language in referring to this statutory
classification. For example, statistics of the United States Department of Justice demon-
strate that between 1989 and 1993, 94.0% of people arrested for sex offenses, excluding
offenses of a commercialized nature such as prostitution, were males. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JuSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at 234
(GPO 1994), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICS-1994, at 386
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995) (reporting that 93.4% of those arrested
for sex offenses, excluding crimes of commercialized nature such as prostitution, were
males); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1992, at 234 (GPO 1993), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICs-1993, at 430 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (noting that males
accounted for 94.0% of arrests); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 230 (GPO 1992), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIsTICs-1992, at 432 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1993) (stating
that males accounted for 94.5% of arrests); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at 191 (GPO 1991), reprinted in
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1991, at 442 (Timothy J. Flanagan &
Kathleen Maguire eds., 1992) (explaining that males accounted for 94.0% of arrests); U.S.
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individual may be committed indefinitely as sexually dangerous in the
absence of a criminal conviction or proof of a mental disorder predisposing
him to commit sex crimes.
Both the legal and medical communities have criticized this new genera-
tion of retention statutes as unconstitutionally infringing the requirements of
present mental illness and "treatability" as prerequisites for commitment to
a psychiatric facility. In this Article, I argue that these retention statutes
comply with Supreme Court precedent that requires neither the existence of
a clinically recognized mental disorder rendering an individual unable to
think or act rationally nor the availability of medical or psychotherapeutic
interventions that are likely to "cure" his condition as preconditions for
involuntary psychiatric commitment.
Part I of this Article outlines the principal features of the involuntary
commitment statutes. Parts II and III then discuss, respectively, Supreme
Court case law relevant to the involuntary commitment of sexual predators
and the lower courts' inconsistent efforts to identify and implement the
Supreme Court's constitutional mandate. Part IV provides a road map out
of the confusion created by the case law, touching first on the level of
scrutiny attendant to due process and equal protection review of these statutes
and then clarifying the parameters of the mental impairment requirement
justifying involuntary psychiatric commitment. Having demonstrated the
legal sufficiency of sexual predator commitment statutes, Part V considers
briefly alternative means of managing sexual predators within the criminal
arena, such as enhanced sentencing and chemical castration.
L The Involuntary. Commitment of Sexual Predators
A. Historical Antecedents
The involuntary commitment of sexual predators has its roots in the
1930s when state legislatures first introduced special procedures for the
detention of "sexual psychopaths," "sexually dangerous persons," and "sex
offenders."" These statutes varied in certain respects, most significantly in
their jurisdictional bases: whereas some required a criminal conviction to
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989, at 189 (GPO 1990), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990,
at 422 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J.. Flanagan eds., 1991) (reporting that males ac-
counted for 94.1% of arrests).
11. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMM. ON PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30S TO THE 80S, at 840 (1977);
Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 215, 224-35 (1960-61).
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trigger their application, others did not even mandate the pendency of crim-
inal charges." On the other hand, while the statutes used differing terminol-
ogy to describe the requisite state of mind, they basically required proof that
the individual "suffer[ed] from such an unstable personality that his sexual
behavior contravene[d] both the law and the social norms of propriety while
demonstrating a compulsive predisposition toward the commission of sexual
offenses."'1 3 And virtually all of the statutes provided for involuntary deten-
tion until such time as the predator no longer posed a threat to society. 4
More than half of the states and the District of Columbia had some form
of sexual predator legislation on the books by 1960. 5 By the end of the
1980s, however, this number had been cut in half, principally due to con-
cerns about civil rights and the apparent lack of success of sex offender
treatment programs. 16 Still, among the early statutory formulations that have
survived, some continue to authorize the commitment of sexual predators in
potentially far-reaching terms.
For example, in Minnesota and the District of Columbia government
officials must demonstrate a history of sexual misconduct combined with an
inability to control one's sexual impulses such that an individual is likely to
continue to pose an ongoing risk of harm. '7 Once committed in accordance
with these provisions, an individual becomes eligible for release only when
he no longer poses a danger to others, as determined by the court or, in the
District of Columbia, by a supervisory official of the institution where he is
confined. 18
12. See Swanson, supra note 11, at 216.
13. Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial
Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 529 (1965-66).
14. Swanson, supra note 11, at 218.
15. Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act: An Examination of a
Statute in Need of Change, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437, 454 n.106 (1988).
16. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to
Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousnessfrom Civil Commitment Proceed-
ings, 39 UCLA L. REv. 213, 215 (1991).
17. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3503(1) (Supp. 1996) (defining sexual psychopath as
someone "who by a course of repeated misconduct in sexual matters has evidenced such lack
of power to control his or her sexual impulses as to be dangerous to other persons"); In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 1994) (noting that state's "psychopathic personality"
statute applies to "those persons who, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,
have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result,
are likely to [harm others]"). Minnesota's present "sexual psychopathic personality"
designation, created in 1994, is basically a recodification of the standard that had existed for
more than 50 years. See infra note 119.
18. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3509; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.17 (West Supp.
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Colorado's Sex Offenders Act,19 by contrast, prescribes a commitment
mechanism in lieu of sentencing' for defendants convicted of certain sex
crimes, including sexual assault and aggravated incest.2 Such proceedings,
which may be initiated by the defendant, the district attorney, or the court,
require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at a separate evidentiary
hearing that the defendant, "if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to
members of the public. "I Instead of providing commitment as an alternative
to sentencing, Illinois allows indefinite psychiatric commitment to substitute
for prosecution of an individual charged with a criminal offense when the
state proves beyond a reasonable doubt' that the individual is a "sexually
dangerous person. "24
B. Contemporary Formulations
After years of declining national interest in the psychiatric commitment
of.sexual predators, the above-referenced jurisdictions notwithstanding, the
1990s have witnessed a resurgence of legislative activity in this area. Unlike
the statutes discussed above, however, the new generation of legislation
focuses on sexual predators who have been tried, convicted, sentenced, and
who are nearing the end of their period of incarceration. Psychiatric com-
mitment serves, therefore, as a means - perhaps the sole means - of
preventing the return of sexual predators to the community where they may
prey upon new victims.
The initial inspiration for this groundswell of legislative action was the
highly publicized case of Earl Shriner who, upon release from a ten-year
sentence for kidnaping and sexually assaulting two teenage girls, raped a
1995); see also Justin v. Jacobs, 449 F.2d 1017, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring) (explaining that defendant is committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital until such
time as Superintendent believes that defendant no longer presents danger to other persons);
Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995) (providing that confinement endures
as long as individual continues to need inpatient treatment and supervision for sexual
disorder and continues to pose public danger).
19. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
20. Id. § 16-13-203 (West 1990).
21. Id. § 16-13-202(5).
22. Id. §§ 16-13-205, -211(2).
23. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 (West 1996).
24. Under the Illinois statute, a sexually dangerous person is someone who has
suffered from a "mental disorder" for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition for
commitment, is predisposed to commit criminal sex offenses, and has "demonstrated
propensities towards acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children." Id.
205/1.01.
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seven-year-old boy, severed his penis, and left him to die.2 In response to
'this tragedy and prior unsuccessful efforts to civilly commit Shriner as
mentally ill and dangerous,' the State of Washington enacted its sexual
predator law in 1990.27 In the wake of additional cases of sexual assault
and murder at the hands of released sex offenders," Wisconsin,'
9 Kansas, 30
Iowa, 31 Minnesota, 32 California, 33 and Arizona' followed suit in 1994 and
1995, enacting new statutory provisions patterned after the Washington law.3
To secure commitment under each of these statutes, the state must prove
that the individual in question is a sexual predator. 36  Generally speaking,
25. Gleb, supra note 16, at 213.
26. Attempting to commit Shriner at the end of his prison term, state authorities were
unable to produce evidence of a "recent overt act" evidencing dangerousness, as was required
under the state's involuntary civil commitment statute for mentally ill persons. Id.
27. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.120 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). Interest-
ingly, the campaign to enact this sort of legislation was initiated by Mrs. Ida Ballasiotes in
1988 following the brutal rape and murder of her daughter by a released sex offender. The
state legislature showed little interest, however, until the Shriner incident. See Juliet M.
Dupuy, Comment, The Evolution of Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 873,
873 (1996).
28. Examples include the abduction, rape, and murder of Megan Kanka in New Jersey,
see supra text accompanying note 5, and the rape and murder of Stephanie Schmidt in Kansas.
See also Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
in Kansas: A Modem Law for Modem Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (1994).
29. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-.12 (West Supp. 1995).
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a15 (1994).
31. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1-.10 (West Supp. 1995). In 1996 and prior to the
statute's effective date, the Iowa Legislature rescinded the statute, replacing it with legislation
providing for enhanced sentencing for convicted sex offenders. See Act of Apr. 10, 1996,
H.F. 2316, §§ 4, 7, 8, 1996 Iowa Legis. Serv. 175, 176-77 (West); see also infra text
accompanying notes 234-36.
32. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.02, 2538.185 (West Supp. 1996). The new provisions
providing for the commitment of "sexually dangerous persons" did not replace those pertaining
to sexual psychopaths, described above. See supra text accompanying note 17. Thus, Minne-
sota officials have two different mechanisms through which they can endeavor to commit sex
offenders.
33. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6608 (West Supp. 1996).
34. Aaiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4601 to -4609 (West Supp. 1995).
35. New Jersey likewise facilitated the commitment of sexual predators in 1994, but did
so by amending its existing civil commitment statute to expressly incorporate repeat sex
offenders. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.1 to -27.22 (West Supp. 1996).
36. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(4) ("sexually violent predator"); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6602 (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05 (Supp. 1995) (same); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West Supp. 1996) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.04(3) (West
Supp. 1995) (same); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252B.185 (West Supp. 1996) ("sexually
dangerous person").
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there are two distinct components to this requirement. First, most states
require a criminal conviction for a sexually violent offense,37 as defined by
the statute, 3 although a criminal charge may also suffice when there was
no adjudication due to trial incompetency or a finding of nonresponsibility
due to mental disease or defect 9.3  Accordingly, as the sex offender nears
the end of his criminal confinement, state officials may petition the court
for mental health commitment. 4° In most jurisdictions, the state officials
bear the burden of proving the offender's eligibility for such commitment
beyond a reasonable doubt.4" Second, the state must demonstrate that the
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(3); CAL. WELF. "& INST. CODE
§ 6600(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN
§ 71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (West Supp. 1995).
Minnesota requires only that the person have "engaged in harmful sexual conduct." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(18)(b) (West Supp. 1996). See also In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129,
132 (Kan. 1996) ("The legislature apparently anticipated that the principal use of the commit-
ment procedure would follow incarceration."), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996).
38. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(3)(a)-(b) (defining sexually violent
offense to include sexual assault, child molestation, murder, or kidnaping determined beyond
a reasonable doubt to have been "sexually motivated"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b)
(including rape, lewd acts with child, sodomy, or oral copulation "when committed by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury"); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02(e)(1)-(12) (Supp. 1995) (listing rape, criminal or aggravated criminal
sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, indecent or aggravated indecent liberties with child,
indecent or aggravated indecent solicitation of child, sexual exploitation of child, or any act
that has been determined "beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated");
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(6) (West Supp. 1996) (naming rape, rape of child,
statutory rape, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, or murder, assault, or burglary
determined beyond reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 980.01(6)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1995) (including sexual assault of child, incest, child entice-
ment, battery, or false imprisonment determined to have been "sexually motivated"). "Sexu-
ally motivated" typically means that one of the reasons that the defendant committed the crime
was sexual gratification. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(d).
39. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(4); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(2)-(4)
(Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.020(l)-.030 (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 980.02 (West Supp. 1995). But see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (West Supp.
1996) (noting that statute is limited to individuals convicted of sexually violent offense against
two or more victims).
40. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4602(A) (Supp. 1995) (requiring petition at
least three months prior to predator's scheduled release); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)
(West Supp. 1996) (mandating petition at least six months prior to release); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a03(a)(1) (Supp. 1995) (demanding petition at least 90 days prior to release); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 1.09.025(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996) (ordering petition at least three
months prior to release); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 80.02(2)(ag) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring
petition at least 90 days prior to release).
41. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4606(A) (Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6604 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
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individual in question suffers from some type of mental abnormality or
disorder, which is commonly defined as "a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity" that predisposes him to
commit sexually violent acts.42 Washington, Kansas, Minnesota, and
Arizona also expressly recognize "personality disorders" as sufficient bases
for commitment, but provide no definition of that term.43
In defining the unique mental impairment suffered by sexual predators,
Washington, Kansas, and Arizona noted the insufficiency of statutory
criteria otherwise applicable to individuals facing involuntary civil commit-
ment in those states:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for the existing involuntary treatment
act .... In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under
[that statute], sexually violent predators generally have antisocial person-
ality features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment
modalities and those features render them likely to engage in sexually
violent behavior.'
CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West Supp. 1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West Supp.
1995). However, not all modem statutes operate in this manner. Minnesota's "sexually
dangerous person" provisions speak neither of criminal charges nor convictions, requiring
instead proof of "a course of harmful sexual conduct" by clear and convincing evidence.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (18)(b)(a) (West Supp. 1996). In determining the sufficiency
of the state's evidence in this regard, the court may thus consider prior sexual misconduct not
resulting in a conviction. See In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that "the statute does not require a conviction to establish a rebuttable presumption
of harmful sexual conduct"). New Jersey has likewise adopted the clear and convincing
evidence standard for civil commitment of sex offenders at the conclusion of their criminal
sentence. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.15(a) (West Supp. 1996).
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(1) (Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6600(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)-(b) (Supp. 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (West
Supp. 1995). While Minnesota requires proof of a mental disorder or dysfunction, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (18)(b)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996), the statute contains no definition of
these terms.
43. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601(4) (Supp. 1995) (recognizing "mental abnormality
or personality disorder"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 1995) (same); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 253B.02(18)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (recognizing "sexual, personality, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1992)
(recognizing "mental abnormality or personality disorder").
44. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992); see also Sexually Violent
Predators Act, ch. 257, § 10(3), 1995 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 2012, 2017 (West); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 1995).
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In formulating its law authorizing the postincarceration s commitment of sex-
ual predators, New Jersey operated under the premise that certain sexual and
other violent offenders "suffer from mental illness which renders them
dangerous to others. "' The legislature then facilitated sexual predators'
detention under the existing civil commitment law by redefining mental ill-
ness as "a current, substantial disturbance of thought, mood, perception or
orientation which significantly impairs judgment, capacity to control behavior
or capacity to recognize reality.47
Based on the belief that psychiatrists had too often interpreted the
unamended definition as requiring the presence of psychosis, 4' which is
absent in most sex offenders, the new version of the New Jersey statute
expressly removed any such requirement in determining the existence of
mental illness.49 Faced with a definition of mental illness similar to that of
the unamended New Jersey statute,"0 Wisconsin chose instead to pattern its
statute after Washington's statute by specifying a separate disorder relating
to sexual predation. New Jersey lawmakers rejected this option, avoiding the
use of the uncertain terminology of "mental abnormality. ""1
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.10(c) (West Supp. 1996).
46. Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 134, § l(a), 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 542, 542
(West).
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added to denote
amended language).
48. Act of Oct. 31, 1994 § 1(c).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West Supp. 1996). According to New Jersey
Deputy Attorney General Daisy Barreto, the new standard reflects "a general concept of
mental illness, what the society thinks would be mentally ill, as opposed to what a psychia-
trist would think." Ralph Siegel, New Law Broadens Use of Psychiatric Detention Legisla-
tion Expanded to Provide More Protection from Sex Offenders, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Aug. 7, 1995, at 5.
50. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13b) (West 1987) ("'Mental illness,' for purposes of
involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception orienta-
tion, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not include alcoholism.").
51. See Claudine M. Leone, Legislative Survey, New Jersey Assembly Bill 155 - A
Bill Allowing the Civil Commitment of Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a
Criminal Sentence, 18 SETON HALL LEGiS. J. 890, 893 n. 15 (1994); see also Tracy Schroth,
Should Punishment Precede the Crime?, 133 N.J. L.J. 61, 61 (1993). California, on
the other hand, appears to have adopted a unique middle ground by relying on the "mental
disorder" terminology of Washington and its progeny but declining to assert that this
"small but extremely dangerous group" of offenders are otherwise inappropriate for in-
voluntary treatment. See Act of Oct. 10, 1995, ch. 762, § 1, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4604,
4605 (West); Act of Oct. 10, 1995, ch. 763, § 1, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4610, 4611
(West).
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At present, therefore, sexual predators face civil commitment in a
number of jurisdictions. Civil commitment usually follows a term of incar-
ceration and is based on a mental defect qualitatively different from that
suffered by others subject to involuntary psychiatric detention. In evaluating
the legal sufficiency of these formulations, it is important first to look to the
U.S. Supreme Court for guidance.
I. The Supreme Court and Involuntary
Commitment from Pearson to Foucha
From 1940 to 1992, the Supreme Court decided a number of cases
addressing the constitutional parameters of involuntary psychiatric commit-
ment, some in the context of sexual predator statutes. Viewed in the aggre-
gate, these cases do not suggest any constitutional infirmity among the
current crop of sexual predator statutes. Replete with procedural safeguards,
the current laws instead represent permissible civil detention vindicating the
states' strong interest in confining and treating dangerous, mentally disor-
dered individuals in a therapeutic environment for the protection of society.
Pearson v. Probate Court,'2 which upheld Minnesota's "psychopathic
personality" statute against due process and equal protection challenges, was
the Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider the psychiatric commitment
of sexual predators. In a unanimous opinion, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the statute was impermissibly vague, finding that its three ele-
ments - a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of
power to control sexual impulses, and a likelihood of future harm - "are as
susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions
for crime."53 The Justices likewise found no equal protection violation,
noting that a legislature may legitimately determine that certain classes of
individuals pose greater risks of public harm and may single out these
individuals for harsher treatment. 54 Finally, the Court held that the proce-
dural safeguards provided - including a hearing, the right to counsel, and
the compulsion of witnesses on the respondent's behalf - are sufficient to
satisfy due process. 55
A series of Supreme Court opinions, beginning in the mid-1960s with
Baxstrom v. Herold,56 suggested the existence of certain procedural require-
ments attendant to the commitment of sexual predators, particularly those
52. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
53. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940).
54. Id. at 274-75.
55. Id. at 275-77.
56. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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previously convicted of sexual or other crimes. In Baxstrom, the Court
struck down a New York statute that allowed the psychiatric commitment
of prisoners at the end of their sentences without, inter alia, jury review,
which was available in all other civil commitments.' In so holding, the
Court rejected the argument that past criminal conduct demonstrated a suffi-
cient need for continued confinement to justify the deprivation of procedural
safeguards .
Citing the stigmatization that accompanies mental health commitment,
the Justices likewise invalidated a Nebraska statute that authorized the
transfer of an allegedly mentally ill inmate serving his criminal sentence to
a psychiatric facility for involuntary inpatient treatment without procedural
protections such as notice, a hearing, and the right to call and to confront
witnesses. 5  Similarly, in Specht v. Patterson,60 the Court found that
Colorado could not indefinitely commit convicted sex offenders in lieu of
sentencing without first providing a range of due process protections, in-
cluding the right to counsel.6
Indeed, while it may be acceptable to provide fewer procedural safe-
guards when detention is brief, indeterminate commitment "cannot rest on
procedures designed to authorize a brief period of observation."62 For ex-
ample, in Humphrey v. Cady63 the Justices questioned, as a matter of equal
protection, the permissibility of denying jury review to convicted sex
offenders facing commitment to a "sex deviate facility" in lieu of sentenc-
ing, when all others facing involuntary civil commitment were afforded the
right to jury review. The Court left open the possibility, however, that
"some special characteristic of sex offenders ... may render a jury deter-
mination uniquely inappropriate or unnecessary."64
It is clear from the foregoing jurisprudence that to pass constitutional
muster, sexual predator statutes that authorize indefinite commitment, par-
ticularly of offenders who have already completed their criminal sentences,
must provide extensive due process protections mirroring those otherwise
57. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110 (1966).
58. Id. at 114.
59. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980).
60. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
61. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1967). In 1968, the Colorado Legisla-
ture modified the statute in accordance with Specht, and the amended version, with only
minor later adjustments, remains in force today. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
62. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Instit., 407 U.S. 245, 249 (1972).
63. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
64. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972).
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provided to civil committees. In fact, most state statutes provide, in vir-
tually all respects, identical or greater procedural safeguards. For example,
whereas most sexual predator statutes require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that an individual is eligible for commitment,6' involuntary civil
commitment is governed by the clear and convincing evidence standard. 66
Jury review is likewise available in sexual predator proceedings in jurisdic-
tions whose commitment process for mentally ill persons so provides,67 with
Arizona extending the right in sexual predator hearings only.68 At such
proceedings, moreover, individuals facing commitment receive a panoply
of evidentiary benefits, including the right to counsel69 and the right to
petition the committing authority for release at regular intervals.70
In addition to providing adequate process, sexual predator commitment
statutes must also be nonpunitive in nature. A punitive commitment statute
would run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as
applied to those defendants who were convicted or acquitted of the underly-
ing offense.7' A punitive commitment statute would also violate the Ex
65. See supra note 41.
66. See, e.g., AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(A) OVest 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2917(h) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.18(1) (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.20(13)(e) (West 1987); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979)
(specifying that criteria for civil commitment must be satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence).
67. Compare, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5302 (West 1984) (noting availability
of jury review in civil commitment of persons other than sexually violent predators), KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-2917(a) (1994) (same), and WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(5) (West 1987)
(same), with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(a) (West Supp. 1996) (describing availabil-
ity of jury review in commitment of sexually violent predators), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a06 (1994) (same), and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(2) (West Supp. 1995) (same).
68. Compare ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-532 to -544 OVest 1993 & Supp. 1995)
(providing laws relating to civil commitment of mentally ill persons other than sexually
violent predators that do not include right to jury trial), with ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
4605(A), -4609(A) (West Supp. 1996) (noting availability of jury review in commitment
proceedings for sexually violent predators).
69. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(a) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a06 (1994); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03(9) (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-27.12(d) (West Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.03(2)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1995).
70. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4609 (stating that sexual predators have
right to petition court annually for release); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6605, 6608 (ex-
plaining that sexual predators have right to petition every year for release, but hearing may
not be granted until expiration of one-year period of commitment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a08 (1994) (same); WASH. RV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(2) (West Supp. 1996) (same).
71. The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes successive prosecutions or successive pun-
ishments for the same offense after an acquittal or an undisturbed conviction. Offenses are
the "same" unless each contains an element not included in the other. See United States v.
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Post Facto Clause as applied to conduct that occurred prior to the statute's
enactment.' In this regard, the Supreme Court noted in Specht that, unlike
the Minnesota "psychopathic personality" statute at issue in Pearson, the
Colorado Sex Offenders Act prescribed "criminal punishment even though
it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to keep individuals from
inflicting future harm." 3 In so characterizing the Colorado statute, the
Court cited the "broad powers" of the Board of Parole over the committed
offender, as well as the application of probationary provisions.7"
With the exception of the Arizona law, all statutes award custody of
committed sexual predators to state mental health authorities which are
responsible for securing appropriate institutional placements.' However,
in light of the Court's more recent decision in Allen v. Illinois,76 Arizona's
assignment of responsibility for sexual predators to corrections officials is
insufficient to render detention punitive in nature, even though the commit-
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932);
see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140 (1996) (stating that civil forfeiture
is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes). Therefore, when punitive commitment as
a sexually violent predator is predicated on a previous conviction or insanity acquittal for
a sex offense, double jeopardy is offended. Double jeopardy is not implicated in the case
of incompetent defendants, however, because no prior adjudication would have taken place.
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 479 (1991) (noting that jeopardy does not attach prior to
"trial before the trier of facts").
With respect to insanity acquittees and incompetent defendants, penal sanctions would
also violate the due process prohibition on punishment for those who have not been found
guilty of a crime. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979). See generally
Amy Baker Benjamin, The Jurisdictional Implications of a Mens Rea Approach to Insanity:
Plugging the Detainment Gap after Foucha v. Louisiana, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 41, 59-60
(1993).
72. The Ex Post Facto Clause "forbids the application of any new punitive measure
to a crime already consummated." California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct.
1597, 1601 (1995) (quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)).
73. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1967).
74. Id. at 609 n.1.
75. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (listing "State Department of Mental
Health"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (naming "secretary of social and rehabilitative
services"); MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.02(3), .18(1) (West 1994) (granting authority to
"Minnesota Security Hospital, a regional center designated by the commissioner [of human
services] or to a treatment facility"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.10(h), .15(a) (West Supp.
1996) (investing custody in state forensic hospital after final hearing); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (investing authority in state "department of social and health ser-
vices"); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01(1), .06(1) (West Supp. 1994) (giving authority to
"department [of health and social services]"). But see ARiz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4606(B)
(investing authority *in state department of corrections).
76. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
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ment proceedings are cloaked in many of the procedural safeguards atten-
dant to criminal prosecutions.
In Allen, the petitioner challenged his commitment under Illinois's
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act).77 In support of his argument that
proceedings under the Act were "criminal" within the meaning of the con-
stitutional guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination,7" Allen pointed
to the manifold criminal safeguards provided, including the prosecution's
burden of proving sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
rights to counsel, jury trial, and confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses.79 The Court was not convinced, concluding that "the State has
indicated quite clearly its intent that these commitment proceedings be civil
in nature; its decision nevertheless to provide some of the safeguards appli-
cable in criminal trials cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal
prosecutions requiring the full panoply of rights applicable there."' 0 The
Act's assignment of sexual predators to a maximum-security psychiatric
facility housing nonsexually dangerous prisoners in need of mental health
services also failed to persuade the Court, because a statute is not rendered
punitive simply by virtue of a state's decision to "supplement its parens
patriae concerns with measures to protect the welfare and safety of other
citizens. "81
The following year, in United States v. Salerno," the Court went even
further, noting that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate
regulatory goal that in and of itself justifies the infringement of liberty
attendant to pretrial detention," provided the incidents of detention are not
excessive in relation to that goal. 4 Paramount among the incidents noted
by the Court as bolstering the sufficiency of such confinement as a matter
77. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
78. The alleged constitutional deprivation was based on the introduction of testimony
at Allen's commitment hearing from two psychiatrists who had evaluated him by court
order, as provided in the Act. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986).
79. Id. at 371.
80. d. at 372.
81. Id. at 373.
82. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
83. At issue was the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which allows federal courts, pursuant
to a finding that "no release conditions 'will reasonably assure.., the safety of any other
person and the community,'" United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (quoting
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142() (1994)), to order the detention, pending trial,
of arrestees of certain serious felonies, such as crimes of violence, offenses where the death
penalty or a life sentence may be imposed, and serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(t).
84. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
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of substantive due process were the "stringent time limitations" of the
detention,' the provision of extensive procedural safeguards, 6 and a nar-
row focus "on a particularly acute problem in which the government inter-
ests are overwhelming."I
Considered together, Allen and Salerno confirm that, on its face, the
detention prescribed by a sexual predator statute is not impermissibly puni-
tive. Even if the law's inspiration was in large part the protection of
society88 and sexual predator proceedings incorporate many attributes of
criminal trials,89 these factors do not defeat the statutes' regulatory purpose
when psychiatric treatment is in fact required and release is mandated if the
mental disorder producing criminality is alleviated. Indeed, California
expressly disavows any punitive purpose,' while Kansas explains its need
for separate detention procedures "for the long term care and treatment" of
sexual predators in light of the poor prognosis for rehabilitation in the
prison setting. 91 All statutes provide, moreover, for periodic review of the
commitment decision and extend a full range of evidentiary protections.'
85. See id. (noting durational limitations imposed by Speedy Trial Act); see also
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992) (noting that detention found constitutionally
permissible in Salerno was "strictly limited in duration").
86. For example, defendants subject to detention are provided an adversary hearing
with the right to counsel, the right to testify and to present information on their behalf, and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The government must, in addition, prove
eligibility for commitment by clear and convincing evidence. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751-52.
87. Id. at 750.
88. See Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 134, § l(a), 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 542 (West)
(providing that "for the protection of the public [sexual predators] are in need of involun-
tary civil commitment for treatment); see also Sexually Violent Predators Act, ch. 257,
§ 10(3), 1995 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 2012, 2017-18 (West) (asserting that existing involuntary
commitment procedures provide inadequate protection against risk of recidivism); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992)
(same).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
90. See Act of Oct. 10, 1995, ch. 762, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4604, 4605 (West); Act
of Oct. 10, 1995, ch. 763, 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4610, 4611 (West) ("It is the intent of
the Legislature that these individuals be committed and treated for their disorders only as
long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive purposes.").
91. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
92. See supra notes 66-70. In Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash.
1995), the court found, conversely, that Washington's sexual predator statute was punitive,
noting that it provided for more limited review than the Illinois statute, applied "to behavior
that it is already criminal," and promoted retribution and deterrence - "the traditional aims
of punishment." Id. at 752. As Allen makes clear, however, the fact that this legislation
may be motivated by the need to protect society is not sufficient to render it punitive when
other indicia of regulatory detention - psychiatric treatment and custody decisions placed
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The characterization of sexual predator statutes as nonpunitive is
necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure their constitutionality as a matter of
substantive due process. In addition, there is the issue of whether a state
may, in fact, commit individuals to psychiatric institutions as sexual preda-
tors, as that term is defined in these statutes. Resolving this inquiry re-
quires a determination of the substantive requirements of involuntary
commitment as applied in this particular context.
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,' the Supreme Court held that the state
lacks a constitutional basis for involuntary civil commitment when an indi-
vidual is mentally ill but is "dangerous to no one and can live safely in
freedom."94 Later, in Addington v. Texas,95 the Justices further specified
that a state must satisfy its commitment criteria by clear and convincing
evidence. 96 Read together, these cases have been viewed as requiring the
state to prove present mental illness and dangerousness by clear and con-
vincing evidence to justify involuntary psychiatric commitment initially. 97
However, the Court has permitted limited departures from this stan-
dard when the state seeks to detain involuntarily criminal defendants that
are incompetent to stand trial or that have been found not guilty by reason
of insanity. In Jackson v. Indiana,98 for example, the Court permitted the
detention of incompetent defendants for a "reasonable period of time" to
assess and achieve fitness for trial, 99 a prescription that has resulted in rela-
tively long-term confinement with no application of the standards otherwise
attendant to involuntary psychiatric commitment. "0 Likewise, in Jones v.
in the hands of noncorrectional personnel - are present. The fact, moreover, that review
may be annual as opposed to semi-annual and provide less than an automatic right to a full
evidentiary hearing is hardly evidence of a punitive purpose; on the contrary, incarceration
is not subject to periodic reconsideration at all. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 996-1000
(vash. 1993) (en bane) (finding statute nonpunitive for purposes of Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses).
93. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
94. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
95. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
96. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (citing Addington for
proposition that mental illness and dangerousness must be established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence in involuntary psychiatric commitment proceedings); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983) (same).
98. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
99. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
100. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitnent of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,
9-19 (1993).
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United States,10 1 the Court sanctioned automatic psychiatric commitment
following an insanity acquittal, reasoning that the jury verdict established
both "concrete evidence" of dangerousness and a presumption of continuing
mental illness sufficient to justify detention."° "This holding," the Court
reasoned, "accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity
Acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from
other candidates for commitment." 103
Foucha v. Louisiana" tested the limits of the Jones Court's distinction
between ordinary and "special" civil commitment, 105 as the Court assessed
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute allowing the indefinite commit-
ment of insanity acquittees who had regained mental health, but were
unable to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they were
no longer dangerous. In a five-to-four decision, the Justices struck down
the law on substantive and procedural due process grounds, noting that an
insanity acquittee may be held in a psychiatric facility "as long as the
acquittee is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer."1"6 Accordingly,
the petitioner, who suffered from an "antisocial personality," 1 was deemed
ineligible for further psychiatric detention because the state did not contend
that his condition constituted mental illness. 18
While it may seem at first blush that Foucha requires present mental
illness and dangerousness for continued psychiatric commitment of insanity
101. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
102. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66.
103. Id. at 370,
104. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
105. The term "special commitment" was proffered by the ABA to describe the separate
civil commitment procedures it recommended, in the wake of Jones, for insanity acquittees
and permanently incompetent defendants whose detention, by virtue of their alleged or
proven criminality, "differs fundamentally from compulsory civil commitment of free
persons." ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.10 commentary at
224 (1984); see also Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards
Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 412 (1985); Elyce
H. Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 574-78 (1985).
106. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).
107. Id. at 78.
108. Id. at 78, 80. Four Justices voted to invalidate the statute on equal protection
grounds based on its prescription of psychiatric commitment on less than clear and convinc-
ing evidence of insanity and dangerousness. Id. at 85-86. While Justice O'Connor felt it
unnecessary to reach the equal protection issue, she commented that "the permissibility of
holding an acquittee who is not mentally ill longer than a person convicted of the same
crimes could be imprisoned is open to serious question." Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment).
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acquittees, this is not the case. Justice O'Connor, who provided the crucial
fifth vote invalidating the statute, explained in a concurring opinion that she
"d[id] not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana may never confine
dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental health. '"109 Detention
is appropriate, Justice O'Connor reasoned, provided that two conditions are
met: First, the nature and duration of the detention must "reflect pressing
public safety concerns related to the acquittee's continued dangerous-
ness. "11 Second, "some medical justification" must exist. "I That is, an
individual may be mentally "healthy," yet suffer from some mental disabil-
ity such that it is medically appropriate to confine him in a psychiatric
hospital.
The juxtaposition of mental illness with medical conditions justifying
special commitment is at odds with Justice White's majority opinion in
Foucha that rejected the involuntary psychiatric confinement of nonmentally
ill acquittees." 2 Justice O'Connor indicated, by the same token, that she
would draw this distinction for all purposes. She noted, for example, that
the "strong" liberty interest of a nonmentally ill acquittee "might well
outweigh" the state's interest in confinement when the only evidence of
dangerousness is the commission of a "nonviolent or relatively minor
crime.""' But, the state's greater regulatory interest combined with the
109. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
110. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
111. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While
Justice O'Connor did not specify what constitutes a valid medical justification, her require-
ment of a "connection between the nature and purposes" of confinement suggests that the
state must provide, at the very least, appropriate treatment for the condition or disorder for
which the acquittee is confined. Id. On this basis, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
permitted the continued detention of an insanity acquittee, who while no longer mentally ill,
suffered from unspecified mental and behavioral disorders, when the state provided treat-
ment programs designed to reduce his associated aggression, hostility, and impulsiveness.
See State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 96, 100, 107 (Wis. 1995).
112. For example, in concluding that Foucha's lack of mental illness necessitated his
release, Justice White quoted Jones for the proposition that psychiatric confinement is
permissible "until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself
or society." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-78 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370
(1983)). Justice White further noted that even if psychiatric commitment were permissible
based on the petitioner's antisocial personality, detention would be "improper absent a
determination in civil commitment proceedings of current mental illness and dangerousness."
Id. at 78.
113. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Courts
and commentators have not argued nor does this Article contend that nonviolent acts of
sexual predation would constitute the type of "relatively minor" crimes contemplated by
Justice O'Connor. Most modem sexual predator commitment statutes require proof of the
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diminished privacy interest of those who undertake criminal acts may justify
lesser commitment standards for insanity acquittees than those applicable to
law-abiding persons.
For four Justices, the civil commitment standard of present mental
illness and dangerousness should be applied consistently to all persons
facing long-term, involuntary psychiatric commitment; the four dissenting
Justices, by contrast, contend that the refusal to draw a distinction between
those who have committed crimes and those who have not committed
crimes attempts an end-run around Jones, which they believe confirms the
constitutional sufficiency of the Louisiana statute." 4 Justice O'Connor has
adopted a middle ground of sorts, recognizing the dissenters' distinction
between those who have committed crimes and those who have not, but
invalidated the' Louisiana statute without "pass[ing] judgment on more
narrowly drawn laws that provide for detention of insanity acquittees." 5
III. The Confusion Below
Unsurprisingly, lower courts have struggled to decipher Foucha's
constitutional mandate with respect to the necessity of mental illness as a
predicate for continued special commitment. This issue has particular
resonance for sexual predator statutes that permit indefinite detention based
on a mental abnormality predisposing individuals towards criminal acts of
sexual predation."6 So far, the Supreme Courts of Washington"7 and Wis-
consin," 8 as well as lower courts in Minnesota" 9 and California,"2 have
commission of a sexually violent offense. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39; infra
text accompanying note 181.
114. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 108 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). There were two dissents filed, one written by Justice Thomas, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined, and the other authored by Justice Kennedy and
joined by the Chief Justice. Of the five Justices in the majority, two - Justice White, who
wrote the opinion, and Justice Blackmun - have retired.
115. Id. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. Inasmuch as sexual predator statutes
address insanity acquittees, incompetent defendants, and criminal convicts, "special" as
opposed to "ordinary" civil commitment procedures may apply. See also Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983); supra text accompanying note 103.
117. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (finding that statute
does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, or Due Process Clause).
118. See State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wis. 1995) (rejecting due process and
equal protection challenges to statute); State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis.
1995) (rejecting ex post facto and double jeopardy claims).
119. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 316-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), addresses the
"sexually dangerous person" classification of the Minnesota statute. Id. Two years earlier,
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found their states' laws to be constitutional."I On the other hand, a federal
district court in Washington struck down its sexual predator statute as
violative of Foucha,- as did the Supreme Court of Kansas, whose decision
the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review during the 1996-97 term."25
Because the Kansas statute was patterned after Washington's statute,
the Weston and Hendricks courts addressed substantially similar legislation.
The courts' substantive due process analysis was complementary, each
finding that Foucha required present mental illness to justify ongoing
commitment124 and that a "personality disorder" or "mental abnormality"
did not satisfy this standard. 5 "Mental abnormality," the Weston court
opined, "has neither a clinically significant meaning nor a recognized
diagnostic use among treatment professionals" and, as with the term "per-
sonality disorder," employs "a circular definitional structure in which the
only observed characteristic of the disorder is the predisposition to commit
sex crimes. "125
Like Hendricks and Weston, the court in Young read Foucha as requir-
ing present mental illness to justify psychiatric commitment, 127 but held that
mental abnormalities and personality disorders are sufficient in this regard
because the legislature's definition "incorporates a number of recognized
in In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912-17 (Minn. 1994), the state supreme court upheld
the constitutionality of the then-existing "psychopathic personality" classification. Id.
However, the "sexual psychopathic personality" designation that replaced it in 1994 is
merely a codification of the standard applicable to the former in the wake of Pearson. See
Katherine P. Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is
an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad" - A Study of Minnesota's
Sexual Psychopathic Pei'sonality Statute, 10 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 227,
291-92 (1996).
120. Hubbart v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara County, No. H015007, 1996 WL 660435,
at *1 (Cal. App. 6th Nov. 14 1996).
121. The New Jersey Supreme Court also recently upheld the involuntary commitment
of a sexual predator under that state's amended definition of mental illness. See In re D.C.,
679 A.2d 634, 648-49 (N.J. 1996); see also supra text accompanying notes 48-50. In so
doing, the court characterized the legislature's actions as merely "clarifying" the mental
illness standard of civil commitment, a process that "does not change the balance of
considerations that must be weighed in the involuntary commitment determination." D.C.,
679 A.2d at 648-49.
122. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749 (W.D. Wash. 1995). The court also
invalidated the statute on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds. See supra note 92.
123. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1540 (1996).
124. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749; Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
125. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750; Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
126. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750.
127. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1006 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
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mental pathologies."" The Young court further held that when the definition
does not include various mental pathologies, clinicians may legitimately
"identify sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other patholo-
gies already [recognized]." 129 Likewise, Blodgett held that, because a
"'psychopathic personality' is an identifiable and documentable violent
sexually deviant condition or disorder,"130 it satisfies Foucha's mental illness
requirement, even though it is not a separate diagnostic category in the
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM).1
3 1
The Post court agreed that the mental disorders specified under Wis-
consin's sexual predator statute were sufficient under Foucha, noting that
"the Supreme Court has declined to enunciate a single definition that must
be used as the mental condition sufficient for involuntary mental commit-
ments."132 Unlike the foregoing decisions, however, the Post court eschewed
reliance on the term "mental illness," emphasizing its lack of "talismanic
significance" in Supreme Court precedent. 33 Instead, in its substantive due
process analysis, the Post court focused on the standard of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha, deeming the "medical justification"
standard satisfied by the state's provision of appropriate therapeutic interven-
tion for sex offenders,134 and on the statute's narrow construction, which
reached only those sex offenders who have been "diagnosed with a disorder
that has the specific effect of predisposing them to engage in acts of sexual
violence." 135
128. Id. at 1001.
129. Id. (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly
Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rnv. 709, 733 (1992)).
130. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994); see supra text accompanying
notes 17, 119.
131. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 & nn.7-8. Noting that "obvious lunacy" is not nec-
essary to justify involuntary commitment, a state appellate court has likewise found that
Minnesota's "sexually dangerous person" provision, which is similar to the psychopathic
personality designation except that it does not require proof of an individual's inability to
control sexual impulses, accords with Foucha and other Supreme Court precedent. See In
re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 317-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
132. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 123 (Wis. 1995).
133. Id. at 122-23.
134. Id. at 127. The Post court noted that Wisconsin is currently in the process of
introducing an inpatient treatment program for sexually violent persons designed to "address
issues at the level of arousal and fantasy as well as behavioral controls, relapse prevention
and the attempt to work on both the underlying disorder as well as the potential dangerous-
ness." Id. at 125.
135. Id. at 124.
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The Post court also rejected the claim that the petitioner's confinement
was unconstitutional under Foucha because the commitment was indefinite
and based on the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Indeterminate
detention is permissible, the court reasoned, when the duration of confine-
ment is linked to the patient's treatment through periodic mental examina-
tions designed to gauge his progress.' 36 The court understood, moreover,
that the impropriety of Foucha's commitment was a function of the state's
concession that Foucha "was neither mentally ill nor was his condition
treatable"; Wisconsin, by contrast, commits only those sexual predators who
have a mental disorder that the state intends to treat. 37
Various courts have considered the sufficiency of personality disorders
as evidence of mental illness under Foucha when addressing procedures pro-
viding for the ongoing commitment of insanity acquittees. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, for example, framed the inquiry in terms of whether an individual's
personality disorder "fits a constitutionally valid legal definition," as opposed
to whether the individual is "ill in the medical sense."'3 Thus, because the
examining psychiatrists agreed that the petitioner's antisocial personality
disorder met the statutory requirement of an "abnormal mental condition,"
the petitioner's continued commitment was valid under Foucha. 
3 9
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise rejected
the argument that personality disorders are insufficient when this category of
mental impairment does not qualify for the insanity defense, noting that
Foucha requires only that continued special commitment "bear 'some reason-
able relation' to the purpose for which the individual was initially commit-
ted."'11 The Supreme Court of Idaho also has permitted continued detention
based on a personality disorder when the same condition led to the peti-
tioner's insanity acquittal in the first place; independent civil commitment
proceedings were necessary only if and when the original basis for commit-
ment had disappeared. 1
136. Id. at 127.
137. Id.
138. Parrish v. Colorado, 78 F.3d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2536 (1996).
139. Id. at 1478. Three weeks later, a state appellate court relying on Parrish further
held that Foucha permits continued commitment based on an antisocial personality disorder
provided that the individual "remains under the effects of a treatable abnormal mental
condition rendering him or her dangerous and such person continues to receive appropriate
treatment for that abnormality." People v. Jones, No. 94-CA-1470, 1996 WL 282291, at
*2 (Colo. Ct. App. May 30, 1996).
140. Jackson v. United States, 641 A.2d 454, 457 (D.C. 1994).
141. In re Nielsen, 902 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Idaho 1995).
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In State v. Perez,42 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Foucha did
not mandate release of a schizophrenic acquittee presently in remission from
mental illness due to drug therapy. The court explained that "synthetic"
sanity-does not remove an individual's "underlying psychological disorder
and need for continuing care." 43 Such reasoning is not only difficult to
reconcile with the plain meaning of "present" mental illness, it has trou-
bling implications for the ability of special committees suffering from
psychotic disorders ever to gain release.
IV. Eliminating the Confusion
The foregoing discussion highlights the uncertainty and confusion
surrounding the permissible scope of involuntary commitment for sexual
predators and others linked to prior criminal activity. This problem ema-
nates essentially from two sources: (1) the Supreme Court's lack of guid-
ance as to what constitutes a "mental illness" sufficient to justify involun-
tary psychiatric commitment; and (2) Foucha's splintered reasoning as to
whether this standard is relaxed when applied to individuals with alleged or
proven criminality.
In Part IV, I will endeavor to navigate out of the confusion by delin-
eating psychiatric standards for the involuntary commitment of sexual
predators that reflect a proper understanding of Supreme Court case law,
as well as the purposes of this special form of detention. In so doing, I will
illustrate the constitutional sufficiency of current sexual predator laws and
will respond to the specific criticisms lodged against them. Before this
undertaking, it is important first to determine the appropriate framework for
constitutional analysis.
A. Resolving the Scrutiny Problem
A threshold issue in determining the sufficiency of sexual predator
statutes from the standpoint of substantive due process and equal protection
is the level of scrutiny required.'" Citing the fundamental liberty interests
142. 648 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1995).
143. State v. Perez, 648 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (La. 1995).
144. While distinctions between these two concepts increasingly have been blurred by
the Court, equal protection challenges are based, at least technically, on statutory classifica-
tions, whereas due process review relates to restrictions on the liberty of all persons. JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW § 10.7, at 348-50, § 11.4, at
369 (4th ed. 1991). Due process and equal protection share the same analytical framework.
Id. § 11.4, at 371; see also R. Randall Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach
to Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards, Ends and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S.
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implicated in sexual predator commitment proceedings, lower courts gener-
ally have applied strict scrutiny. 4 s However, as Justice Thomas noted in
Foucha, there is no fundamental right to "freedom from bodily restraint"
applicable to all persons regardless of the circumstance." If such a right
existed, the Court would not have used less deferential forms of scrutiny
when reviewing legislation concerning, for example, pretrial detention47
and the custodial detention of alien minors. 48
On the other hand, as I have argued elsewhere in the context of insan-
ity acquittees and individuals permanently incompetent to stand trial, U.S.
Supreme Court precedent provides strong historical support for the applica-
tion of midlevel review to laws effecting involuntary psychiatric commit-
ment. 149 Because the rigor of the Court's heightened scrutiny has varied, 150
I have advocated a "particularly exacting standard" for involuntary psychiat-
ric commitment, in light of the substantial deprivation of liberty involved
TEx. L.R. 493, 499, 507 (1992) (comparing approach and standard of review in equal
protection and due process challenges).
145. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748 (W.D. Wash. 1995); In re
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 144-45 (Kan.) (Larson, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
2522 (1996); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. 1994); State v. Post, 541
N.W.2d 115, 122 (Wis. 1995); In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 317 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
146. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 118 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (assessing legitimacy
of government interest and availability of alternative purpose rationally connected to pretrial
detention of adults charged with certain felonies); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1983)
(performing same analysis in context of specified juvenile detention procedures).
148. See Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447-49 (1993) (stating that inasmuch as no
fundamental right was implicated by regulations providing for involuntary detention of alien
minors awaiting deportation proceedings, there need only be "reasonable fit" between
government's purpose of protecting welfare of juveniles in its custody and means chosen to
advance that purpose).
149. See John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered "Super-Criminals": A
Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 Hous. L. REv. 651, 669-81 (1996).
150. For example, in some instances the Court has demanded that a classification be
"narrowly drawn," or not substantially more burdensome than necessary to accomplish the
state's objectives, whereas in other instances a "reasonable relationship" or "rough propor-
tionality" between means and ends has been sufficient. See Cornwell, supra note 149, at
678 & nn.123-25. United States v. Virginia's requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" in the context of gender-based discrimination constitutes the most relevant
evidence of a range of midlevel review. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274-
75 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist has labeled this development as unfortunate and instead
favors exclusive reliance on the traditional test wherein a classification must bear a "substan-
tial relationship to an important government interest" to pass constitutional muster. See id.
at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
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and the political powerlessness and social and cultural isolation faced by
class members."' This approach is consistent, moreover, with language in
both the majority and concurring opinions in Foucha that speak, respec-
tively, of the need for a "particularly convincing reason" for detention'"
and for an appropriate "fit" between the nature and purpose of detention.
53
A fortiori, sexual predator statutes merit similar scrutiny. Like the
foregoing laws allowing involuntary psychiatric commitment, sexual preda-
tor statutes prescribe long-term involuntary detention. Moreover, by virtue
of the heinousness of their (alleged) misconduct, sexual predators arguably
enjoy less political power and more public antipathy than other mentally
disordered offenders.'54 Accordingly, the state must proffer an "exceed-
151. See Cornwell, supra note 149, at 679-8 1.
152. The Foucha majority stated that because "[f]reedom from physical restraint is a
fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing reason" for committing sane
acquittees. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). Although fundamental rights
language suggests strict scrutiny, I disagree with those commentators who have suggested
that the Court is advocating such review here. See, e.g., James W. Ellis, Limits on the
State's Power to Confine "Dangerous" Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha v.
Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 635, 645 & n.44 (1992); C. Peter Erlinder,
Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the "Politically Il1," 19 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 99, 155 & n.330 (1993). A "particularly convincing reason" sounds less demanding
than the "compelling state interest" traditionally required in this context. See generally Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972) (stating that compelling state interest is necessary to justify
infringement on fundamental right to privacy); Shapiro v. Thomas, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(requiring compelling state interest in context of fundamental right to interstate travel).
Rather, it seems more akin to the "exceedingly persuasive justification" necessary to support
gender-based classifications under the heightened or "skeptical" scrutiny standard. See
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274 (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, exclusion of women
from Virginia Military Institute, public institution of higher learning).
153. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that "the nature and duration of detention [must]
be tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns relat[ing] to the acquittee's continuing
dangerousness"); see also Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
confinement in mental hospital implicates individual's "core liberty interest" thereby
triggering heightened scrutiny that requires state to demonstrate "sufficiently compelling"
reason for its actions).
154. See, e.g., Peter Davis, The Sex Offender Next Door, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1996,
at 20 (Magazine) (noting that released sex offender "could not be more of an outcast if he
were a leper"); Erica Goode, Battling Deviant Behavior, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept.
19, 1994, at 74 (noting that even imprisoned sex offenders "are at the bottom of the social
totem pole"); Stephen J. Rossetti, The Mark of Cain: Reintegrating Pedophiles, AMERICA,
Sept. 9, 1995, at 9 (noting that "child molesters have always been the 'lowest of low' in
society, even in prisons"); David van Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor, TIME, July 26, 1993, at
58 (noting that "mass culture and some experts view violent sex offenders as irredeemable
monsters").
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ingly persuasive justification" 55 for sexual predators' commitment that may
circumscribe, in certain respects, the constitutional protections normally
available to individuals facing involuntary psychiatric detention.
B. A Sufficient Mental Impairment
Under Supreme Court precedent, the state may involuntarily commit
individuals to a psychiatric hospital upon proof, by clear and convincing
evidence, of mental illness and dangerousness. 56 When the mental illness
that serves as a predicate to commitment is clinically recognized, treatable,
and characterized by the inability to reason, its constitutional sufficiency is
not open to serious question, and this Article accepts that the mental illness
provides an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for confinement. How-
ever, the purported absence of these attributes in the mental disorder
provisions of sexual predator statutes has been widely criticized.
These criticisms are without merit. To constitute a sufficient justi-
fication for commitment, the mental impairment specified in sexual predator
statutes does not require diagnostic recognitions by the psychiatric com-
munity, nor must it be characterized by the inability to engage in rational
decision making. The existence, moreover, of a limited right to effec-
tive treatment in this context does not invalidate the statutory formulation,
in light of advances currently underway in the treatment of sexual preda-
tors.
1. Mental Abnormality
Critics have attacked the definition of mental abnormality in the sexual
predator statutes as both circular and unscientific. I will address each
contention in turn.
a. Circularity
As noted earlier, sexual predator statutes commonly define a mental
abnormality or disorder as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the'
emotional or volitional capacity" that predisposes an individual to commit
sexually violent acts." This construction, according to Professor Stephen
Morse, "collapses all badness into madness" by making "the content of
abnormality ... entirely parasitic on the requirement of 'criminal sexual
155. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
157. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
1319
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293 (1996)
acts."" 8 Professor John Q. La Fond agrees, labeling the definition "a pure
tautology, conflating both diagnosis and prediction with a single incident of
criminal behavior."'5 9
I agree that this construction predicates the existence of mental abnor-
mality on the commission of acts of sexual violence and, further, that a
single criminal act may suffice for this purpose. This construction does not
suggest, however, that all individuals who engage in an act of sexual
violence will be deemed mentally abnormal by virtue of that act. A jury
may alternatively conclude that the offending conduct was the product of
a unique set of circumstances unlikely to repeat themselves, as opposed to
a genetic or acquired disorder. Consider, for example, the first-time
offender who while inebriated sexually'assaults a woman because he be-
lieved, unreasonably and erroneously, that she wanted to have sex with
him. While a jury may find him guilty of sexual assault, it need not
necessarily find that his actions stem from pathology since "[n]ot all persons
who commit sexually violent crimes*. . . suffer[] from mental disorders,
nor are all persons with a mental disorder predisposed to commit [such]
offenses."" t' The statutory definition of mental abnormality distinguishes
those offenders who suffer from a mental disorder and who are predisposed
to commit sexual offenses from all other offenders.
b. The Law and the DSM
Critics further argue that because the mental abnormality or disorder
described in these statutes is not found in the DSM, it lacks clinical mean-
ing and cannot serve as the basis for involuntary, psychiatric commit-
ment.' 61 This position fails, however, to apprehend important differences
158. Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.
L. REv. 113, 137 (1996).
159. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 755, 764 (1992);
see also Andrew Horwitz, Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is There Anywhere to Go but
Backwards?, 57 U. PrIr. L. REV. 35, 54 & n.113 (1995); Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychia-
trist's Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. RE v. 597, 602 (1992).
160. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 124 (Wis. 1995); see also Alexander D. Brooks,
The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 709, 732 (1992). Professor Brooks characterizes sexual assaulters
that are appropriate for commitment as those with "a recurrent, compulsive urge and a
pathological need to repetitively carry out psychologically driven rape." Id.
161. See, e.g., Erlinder, supra note 152, at 141-42; La Fond, supra note 159, at 764;
James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychiatrist's
Perspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 849, 849-50 (1992); Wettstein, supra note 159,
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between clinical and legal conceptualizations of mental disease. The DSM
is a uniform diagnostic system designed to aid clinicians in identifying and
treating individuals beset by functional impairments. 16 Legal definitions of
mental illness, by contrast, are not based exclusively on therapeutic needs
and vary in accordance with other societal concerns, such as moral respon-
sibility, safety, and fair process. 63 Thus, attempting to graft one system
completely onto the other is inappropriate, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's emphatic rejection of "the suggestion that [lawmakers']
power to legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the
psychiatric community. "164
Relying on the DSM to define legal mental illness is also troubling for
other reasons. The manual has gone through several revisions since its ini-
tial introduction,"6 with some conditions, such as Premenstrual Dysphoric
Disorder (PMDD), added and others, such as homosexuality, deleted."
at 603-04; Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator
Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 Hous. L. REV. 775,
802 (1995).
162. AMERICAN PSYcHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS xv-xvi (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
163. See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health
System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & LAW 161, 171 (1995).
164. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 & n.13 (1983) (rejecting argument
that legislative presumption of continuing dangerousness following insanity acquittal is un-
warranted because psychiatric research does not support predictive value of prior dangerous
acts for future dangerousness). Psychiatric predictions of dangerousness have continued to
demonstrate limited reliability in the decade following Jones and have failed, despite recent
improvements, to achieve accuracy rates in excess of 50%. See Robert Menzies et al., The
Dimensions of Dangerousness Revisited: Assessing Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 25 (1994) (noting "dearth of statistically verifiable and clinically
operational assessment criteria" of dangerousness and lack of guarantee of significant
improvement in future). However, this lack of reliability need not result in limitations on
the use of clinical testimony as to future dangerousness, as some have argued. See, e.g.,
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 148-54 (1984).
Rather, the lack of reliability suggests the need for prophylactic procedural protections
designed to enhance predictive accuracy. See Cornwell, supra note 149, at 716-17. Sexual
predator commitment statutes contain a host of such protections, including jury determina-
tions, periodic review, and the requirement in most jurisdictions of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that an individual is a sexual predator. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying
text.
165. The first edition of the DSM was published in 1952. See DSM-IV, supra note
162, at xvii. The fourth and most current edition, DSM-IV, was introduced in 1994. Id.
at xv.
166. PMDD first appeared in the DSM's revised version of the third edition, DSM-Efl-
1321
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293 (1996)
Accordingly, an individual may be viewed as having a mental impairment
one day and not the next, a result all the more unsettling in light of the
political pressures that may bear on a condition's inclusion in or exclusion
from the DSM 167 and allegations within the psychiatric community that
diagnostic categories are as much a reflection of the beliefs and values of
the drafters of the manual as they are of scientific data.16
c. Personality and Sexual Disorders
Whether or not a statute expressly refers to personality disorders in
defining the mental abnormality necessary for commitment, the importance
of such disorders is paramount in the case of sexual predators whose
clinical diagnosis is often based on this category of mental dysfunction.169
Sexual predators may also suffer from one or, more "paraphilias, '17 a
catchall phrase for various forms of sexual deviancy, including pedo-
philia "I While personality and sexual disorders are included in the DSM,
various courts and commentators have contended that such disorders do not
constitute present mental illness under Foucha and, hence, cannot justify
involuntary psychiatric detention.17
R, under the name "Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder." See PAULA J. CAPLAN, THEY
SAY You'RE CRAZY 91 (1995). The third edition removed most references to homosexual-
ity, a process completed in DSM-IV. Id. at 180-81.
167. See Brooks, supra note 160, at 731-33 (illustrating political considerations
contributing to exclusion of "pathologically driven rape" from DSM-IIM-R).
168. See CAPLAN, supra note 166, at 85.
169. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Minn. 1994) (recognizing polysubstance
abuse and antisocial personality disorder); In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (naming antisocial personality disorder); see also Hammel, supra note 161, at
808 (noting that antisocial personality disorder is most common diagnosis of sex offenders).
Various state legislatures have acknowledged the primacy of antisocial personality disorders
in authorizing the commitment of sexual predators. See supra text accompanying note 44
(explaining that sexual predators have "antisocial personality features," as opposed to
"mental disease or defect that [would] render] them appropriate for the existing involuntary
treatment act").
170. DSM-IV defines paraphilias, in significant part, as "recurrent, intense sexually
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving . . . the suffering or
humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or... children or other nonconsenting persons, that
occur over a period of at least six months." DSM-IV, supra note 162, at 522-23.
171. See, e.g., In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan.) (listing pedophilia), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1002 (Wash. 1993) (en banc)
(including paraphilia); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Wis. 1995) (naming personality
disorder and pedophilia); State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Wis. 1995) (same).
172. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (asserting
that antisocial personality disorder or other personality disorders "falling short of mental
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However, Justice White's opinion in Foucha on which critics rely,
does not expressly exclude detention based on personality disorders. Under
Justice White's reasoning, Terry Foucha's commitment was impermissible
not because of the inadequacy of an antisocial personality disorder as
evidence of present mental illness, but rather because the state conceded
that Foucha was not mentally ill173 and mental illness was necessary to
continue to confine him in a psychiatric institution.174
Reliance on Justice White's reasoning is misplaced, at any rate, because
Justice O'Connor, who provided the crucial fifth vote for the majority,
would not require present mental illness to justify commitment, and she is
joined, for this purpose, by the four dissenting Justices, all of whom remain
illness" are insufficient under Foucha); Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 137-38 (noting that pedo-
philia does not satisfy Foucha's requirement of present mental illness); Bruce J. Winick,
Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 534, 545, 576-77 (1995) (concluding that personality and sexual disorders are
not mental illnesses justifying commitment under Foucha); see also Erlinder, supra note
152, at 141-42, 154 (suggesting that antisocial personality disorder is not mental illness,
which Foucha requires for involuntary psychiatric commitment); La Fond, supra note 159,
at 761 (stating that personality disorders are insufficient basis for commitment under
Foucha).
173. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992) ("Louisiana does not contend that
Foucha was mentally ill at thetime of the trial court's hearing. Thus, the basis for holding
Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee has disappeared, and the State is no
longer entitled to hold him on that basis.").
174. If personality disorders constitute present mental illness, the psychiatric commit-
ment of sexual predators is clearly appropriate based on proof, by clear and convincing
evidence, that sexual predators suffer from such a disorder and are presently dangerous.
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362-63 & n.10 (1983). Some, commentators have
suggested that Foucha rejects antisocial personality disorder as a basis for commitment "as
a matter of constitutional law." See La Fond, supra note 159, at 762 (interpreting Foucha
as establishing a "categorical conclusion that 'personality disorder' and 'antisocial personal-
ity disorder' do not constitute mental illness"); see also Winick, supra note 172, at 544.
However, this theory would call into serious question the Court's earlier decision in
Pearson, which upheld a Minnesota "psychopathic personality" statute that contained a
mental impairment requirement amounting to a limited form of this condition. See In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 1994) (discussing nexus between psychopathic
personality and antisocial personality disorder). The Foucha Court's failure to signal any
erosion in Pearson's vitality suggests, at the very least, a disinclination to decide the
sufficiency of this disorder. See Brooks, supra note 160, at 728 (noting Pearson's implicit
support for commitment on basis of antisocial personality disorder). Professor Erlinder, on
the other hand, questions Pearson's current validity by arguing that it is the only Supreme
Court case "upholding involuntary [mental health] commitment without any finding of
mental illness." Erlinder, supra note 152, at 122. However, Erlinder's position fails to
take account of the Court's recognition that differences between individuals with psycho-
pathic personalities and others facing involuntary commitment may justify the imposition of
different standards. See supra text accompanying notes 93-108.
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on the Court today. By the same token, Justice O'Connor's adoption of a
"medical justification" standard for ongoing psychiatric detention is not
shared by the dissenters, who would permit psychiatric detention based on
dangerousness alone. Still, as the "least common denominator" command-
ing a five-Justice majority, "medical justification" becomes the de facto
legal standard of Foucha.
Accordingly, Foucha permits the commitment of individuals suffering
from sexual and personality disorders, provided there is a medical justifica-
tion for their confinement in a psychiatric facility, coupled with present
dangerousness17 and an adjudicative finding of serious criminal conduct. 76
Some sexual predator statutes apply, however, to incompetent defendants
177
or to individuals who have not been charged with a crime,17 while Illinois's
"sexually dangerous person" provisions pertain only to persons with a
pending charge.' 79 Because the absence of any proven criminality removes
incompetents, arrestees, and nondefendants from the umbrella of Foucha,
their commitment in the absence of present mental illness is valid only if
there is an "exceedingly persuasive" reason for treating them more like
individuals convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity of serious
offenses than like others facing involuntary psychiatric detention. Thus, it
is important to ask whether, in this context, relaxing the mental illness
requirement otherwise applicable in involuntary psychiatric commitment
"serves 'important government objectives ... [and is] substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.'
With respect to incompetents, all three sexual predator statutes that
provide for their confinement require a precommitment hearing in which
the state must prove the defendant's factual guilt of a sexually violent
offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and "all constitutional rights
available to defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried
175. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
176. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (comment-
ing that insanity acquittal "provides 'concrete evidence' of dangerousness" which "sets [in-
sanity acquittee] apart from ordinary citizens" but that it is not "permissible to treat all
acquittees alike, without regard to their particular crimes"); see also id. at 76 (noting that
insanity verdict "establishes . . . that the defendant committed an act that constitutes a crim-
inal offense") (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983)); supra note 113.
177. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
179. 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 105/3 (West 1996).
180. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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while incompetent, shall apply."' Likewise, Illinois requires proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that an individual is a "sexually dangerous person,"
defined in part as someone who has "criminal propensities to the commis-
sion of sex offenses [and who has] demonstrated propensities towards acts
of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children."" Because
commitment is predicated in both instances on a determination, under the
standard of proof applicable to criminal prosecutions, that an incompetent
or an arrestee has engaged in sexually predatory behavior, these individuals
are sufficiently similarly situated to insanity acquittees and criminal convicts
to justify the application of like detention procedures.
In Minnesota, however, the state may commit an individual neither
charged with nor convicted of a crime upon demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that he has a "sexual psychopathic personality" or is
a "sexually dangerous person."'" The District of Columbia's statute
specifies no evidentiary burden, stating only that commitment ensues if an
individual "is determined to be a sexual psychopath.'s These statutory
formulations complicate the analogy to convicts and insanity acquittees and
call into question whether proof of. the risks of re-offending sufficiently
outweighs the individual liberty interest.
Notwithstanding these concerns, I believe that clear and convincing
evidence of harmful sexual conduct overcomes individual liberty interests
such that the state, in light of its undeniably substantial interest in protecting
citizens, may specify alternative standards for psychiatric detention of the
181. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4606(D) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a07(b) (Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(2) (West Supp. 1996).
182. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1.01.
183. While these two designations share common features, under the sexually dangerous
person designation, "the state need not demonstrate that the person wholly lacks the ability
to control his or her sexual impulses." In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 316 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996). In addition, while the definition of a "sexual psychopathic personality" is silent
as to criminality, a conviction for certain sex offenses creates a rebuttable presumption of
"harmful sexual conduct" for purposes of committing someone as a "sexually dangerous
person." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02(7)(a), .02(18)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
New Jersey also commits sexual predators with no pending criminal charge upon a
demonstration by clear and convincing evidence of their danger to others, which is defined
in terms of the infliction of serious bodily harm or causing serious property damage. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(i) OVest Supp. 1996). However, as discussed above, New Jersey
contends that sexual predators are mentally ill by electing to modify the definition of mental
illness to include an incapacity "to control behavior." Id. § 30:4-27.2(r). Thus, sexual
predators are committed as mentally ill and dangerous under the procedures and standards
applicable to all other civil committees.
184. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3508 (Supp. 1996). Case law is no more availing in this
regard.
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kind envisioned by Justice O'Connor in Foucha. A preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, by contrast, provides insufficient proof of both past and
future wrongdoing; potentially indefinite detention precludes resort to an
evidentiary burden that allocates the risk of error equally between the
individual and the state.'8
2. Treatment and Treatability
Apart from the argument that commitment based on personality and
sexual disorders violates Foucha, critics further contend that such impair-
ments are an insufficient basis for psychiatric detention because these
disorders are not amenable to treatment. This position presupposes both a
constitutional right to effective treatment for individuals involuntarily com-
mitted to psychiatric facilities and an understanding of the parameters of
that right which renders current efforts to treat sex offenders inadequate.
While the Supreme Court has never confronted the treatment issue
directly, the Justices have brushed up against it on several occasions. Jack-
son v. Indiana, for example, proclaimed that the nature of psychiatric com-
mitment must "bear some reasonable relation to its purpose."' 8 6 Ten years
later, in Youngberg v. Romeo,"s the Court held that institutionalized men-
tally retarded residents have the right to "minimally adequate training...
as may be reasonable in light of [their] liberty interests in safety and
freedom from unreasonable restraints." 88 In finding that Illinois's commit-
ment scheme was not punitive, the Allen Court emphasized the provision
of psychiatric treatment to sexually dangerous persons, 89 while the Foucha
majority asserted disapprovingly that allowing "a disorder for which there
is no effective treatment" to serve as the basis for commitment was "only
a step away" from allowing detention based on dangerousness alone.190
Viewed in the aggregate, these cases suggest a right to some form of
treatment for individuals subjected to involuntary psychiatric commitment.
185. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
186. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
187. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
188. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
189. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) ("[The State serves its purpose of
treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an
institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and treatment.").
190. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992). Wholly ineffective treatment
might likewise provide an insufficient "medical justification" for detention by eroding the
"necessary connection between the nature and purposes of confinement." Id. at 88
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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The constitutional necessity of treatment is particularly acute in the case of
sexual predators that have an express statutory entitlement to treatment. 191
As Justice Blackmun argued in Youngberg, when the state has based "depri-
vations of liberty at least partially upon a promise of treatment, [it] ineluc-
tably has committed the community's resources to providing minimal treat-
ment. "192
Although Foucha suggests that the Court is uncomfortable authorizing
involuntary commitment when the prospects for recovery are dim, 93 the
Justices have provided no insight into what might constitute minimally
adequate or effective treatment. The Youngberg majority simply noted that
lower courts should "show deference to the judgment of qualified profes-
sionals" in this regard." This lack of judicial guidance has, unsurpris-
ingly, produced a wide range of opinions. 95
For example, while acknowledging that Supreme Court case law indi-
cates a right to treatment, Professor Brooks argues that treatment need not
be efficacious, adding that "the goal of the [sexual predator] statute is not
primarily treatment." '196 Professor La Fond, on the other hand, reads these
191. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4606(B) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that
sexual predators "shall receive care and treatment"); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(a)
(West Supp. 1996) (noting that State Department of Mental Health "shall afford" treatment);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (Supp. 1995) (giving commitment to custody of secretary
of social and rehabilitation services for "custody, care and treatment"); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09060(1)(a)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1996) (providing commitment to custody of
department of social and health services for "custody, care and treatment"); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 980.069(1) (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing commitment to custody of department
of health and social services for "custody, care and treatment").
192. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
193. See supra text accompanying note 190.
194. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
195. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMMITEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW, supra note 11, at 929. The Committee notes:
[Some] view adequacy as implying no more than meeting decent standards of bed
and board; [others] believe that adequacy implies not only reliance on generally
agreed upon modes of treatment, but also that the required treatment should be
carried out by those qualified and experienced in administering the appropriate
treatment needed for an individual. Between these poles a continuum of opinion
exists about treatment adequacy.
Id.
196. Brooks, supra note 160, at 735. As discussed above, sexual predator statutes,
including the Washington statute addressed by Professor Brooks, require the state to provide
treatment. See supra text accompanying note 191; see also In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997
(Wash. 1993) (en banc) (noting that Washington statute requires "care and treatment for the
committed individual... in a psychiatric facility").
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same decisions as requiring "bona fide" treatment,"9 which, whatever it is,
is more than Professor Brooks would require. Professor Winick, by con-
trast, embraces a concept of "therapeutic appropriateness" which suggests
that conditions that do not respond to organic (that is, pharmacological)
treatment techniques19 that have become "the hallmark of the modem psy-
chiatric hospital" cannot serve as the basis for involuntary commitment. 19
Although Professor Winick's distinction between drug and other forms
of therapy is tenuous," Professor Brooks's suggestion that the efficacy of
treatment is irrelevant is likewise specious in light of the Court's references
to "adequate training" and "effective treatment" and its desire for congru-
ence between the means and ends of psychiatric commitment. Indeed, if
consideration of the effectiveness of treatment was eliminated entirely, state
psychiatric hospitals might provide sex offenders with the most minimal and
cheapest form of therapeutic intervention necessary to relieve the state's
obligation without regard to its impact on the sexual predator's ability ever
to gain release."' Such a result would render illusory the state's justifica-
tion for confining sexual predators which is based, in part, on providing
psychiatric treatment.' Moreover, due process principles do not allow the
197. La Fond, supra note 159, at 767.
198. See Winick, supra note 172, at 556-67.
199. Id. at 608.
200. Professor Winick relies, for example, on Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990), and Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), which concern the parameters of the
state's right forcibly to administer antipsychotic medication respectively to convicts and to
criminal defendants. Even assuming arguendo that these cases support Winick's proposition
that medical intervention is impermissible if the intervention is not therapeutically justifiable,
the cases do not even address the psychotherapy, much less distinguish it from other forms of
psychiatric intervention.
201. See David W. Burgett, Note, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of
Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 205, 224
(1981) (noting that Jackson's "reasonable relation" requirement would be "empty concept if
any benefit, no matter how minuscule, will justify any deprivation of liberty, no matter how
great").
202. It would, moreover, convert the confinement of sexual predators into indefinite pre-
ventive detention. While the Salerno Court recognized the government's regulatory authority
to preventively detain dangerous individuals based solely on the need to protect society, it
emphasized the strictly limited duration of such detention under the statute at issue. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987). In construing Illinois's sexual predator act as
noncriminal, the Allen Court relied on the statute's dual purposes of both protecting society
and providing treatment without commenting on the permissibility of predicating regulatory
confinement solely on a public safety rationale. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986).
It is therefore unclear whether the Court would view a statutory scheme permitting the indef-
inite preventive detention of sexual predators as excessive in relation to its purpose, and hence
punitive. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (noting that restrictions on liberty are punitive when
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transformation of mental health institutions into warehouses for the socially
dangerous.
By the same token, there needs to be a great deal of flexibility in the
determination of what constitutes effective treatment for purposes of justify-
ing commitment. The fact that the therapeutic regimen prescribed for a
certain class of individuals may prove initially disappointing should not
entitle the individuals to release before clinicians have had the opportunity
to enhance and modify the treatment to yield greater gains. Any contrary
policy would not only preclude the commitment of some for whom involun-
tary detention is appropriate, but it would also risk forestalling progress in
the management of certain seemingly intractable conditions." °3
The need for flexibility cannot, however, justify indeterminate, invol-
untary psychiatric detention. At some point, if treatment protocols fail to
produce positive results, treatment ceases to provide a legitimate basis for
commitment that is based, at least in part, on the provision of care and
treatment. This does not mean that therapeutic interventions must result in
the successful management of a majority of those treated - indeed, that
would likely prove an insuperable standard with respect to certain illnesses
or disorders. Instead, there must be either: (1) demonstrable improvement
over a number of years in the proportion of individuals afflicted by a
condition that can gain release into the community; or (2) sufficient commu-
nity re-entry indicative of an acceptable level' of treatment success.2 5
While the medical community historically has reported poor outcomes
in treatment programs for sex offenders, 2° recent studies suggest that
incidents of detention are excessive in relation to regulatory goal government seeks to achieve).
203. Otherwise, because schizophrenia was generally considered untreatable before the
introduction of psychotropic drugs, see Winick, supra note 172, at 558, schizophrenics would
have been previously ineligible for involuntary commitment, despite both the propriety of
involuntarily confining at least some schizophrenics in an institutional setting and the clini-
cians' need for developing more effective interventions through work with these patients.
204. In making this determination, courts will need to solicit and weigh the testimony of
professionals in the field. While such testimony merits deference, according it presumptive
validity is unwise when clinicians are in essence evaluating the sufficiency of their own
therapeutic interventions. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982); see also
Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts ": From Deference to Abdication Under the
Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 691-92 (1992).
205. As discussed above, the limited right to effective treatment advocated here is directed
at individuals involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment. The involuntary commitment
of persons in need of significant custodial care, such as the severely mentally retarded,
presents issues additional to and distinct from those considered here, and this distinction may
dictate a contrary standard.
206. See, e.g., NATHANIEL J. PALLONE, REHABILITATING CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHO-
PATHS 80-84 (1990) (discussing studies indicating lack of effectiveness of sex offender
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considerable progress is presently being made. 27 For example, two com-
prehensive reviews have concluded that treatment of sex offenders can
subsequently reduce recidivism,2°8 although "not all programs are successful
and not all sex offenders profit from treatment."I W.L. Marshall and his
colleagues found, for example, that comprehensive cognitive-behavioral
programs were among the most effective, but cautioned that child molesters
and exhibitionists were more likely to benefit than were rapists.
210
Other researchers have, however, reported modest success in reducing
recidivism among rapists. Janice Marques and her colleagues reported a
dramatically lower rate of sex offense recidivism among rapists that partici-
pated in a cognitive-behavioral program conducted by the California De-
partment of Mental Health as compared to those rapists that were not
treated.21' While the smallness of the sample size precluded statistical
significance among rapists, reductions in the re-offense rate for the much
larger group of child molesters was significant.2 2 Functional differences
between these two groups of offenders and others suggest, moreover, that
specialized modalities may enhance outcomes further.2 3
treatment programs); Anthony D. Oliver, The Mentally Disordered Sex Offender: Facts and
Fictions, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 87, 95 (1982-83) (stating that California state hospitals
"are inadequate for anything but the warehousing of the sex offender"); Reardon, supra note
161, at 850 (asserting that no "scientifically valid treatment" exists for sexual predators);
Alan A. Stone, Quasi-Criminal Confinement: Sex Psychopaths and Defective Delinquents,
in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 179, 184-85 (1975) (presenting
studies indicative of inconsistent success, if any, of sex offender treatment programs).
207. Horwitz, supra note 159, at 45 n.54; Wettstein, supra note 159, at 616.
208. Gordon C.N. Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of
Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 802, 806 (1995)
(reporting 19% reoffense rate for treated versus 27% for untreated); W.L. Marshall et al.,
Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 11 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 465, 480 (1991).
209. Marshall et al., supra note 208,, at 480; see also Hall, supra note 208, at 805-08.
210. Marshall et al., supra note 208, at 480-81.
211. Janice Marques et al., Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment on Sex Offender
Recidivism, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAv. 28, 49 (1994) (noting 27.8% sex offense recidivism
rate for untreated "controls" versus 9.1% for participants in Sex Offender Treatment and
Evaluation Project). All participants in the study were convicted of either child molestation
or rape and satisfied a variety of additional criteria, including age (18 to 60), admission of
guilt, IQ (at least 80), and the absence of "a psychotic or organic mental condition." Id.
at 35.
212. Id. at 49.
213. See W.D. Pithers, Treatment of Rapists: Reinterpretation of Early Outcome Data
and Exploratory Constructs to Enhance Therapeutic Efficacy, in SEXUAL AGGRESSION:
ISSUES IN ETIOLOGY, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 167, 173 (Gordon C.N. Hall et al. eds.,
1993) [hereinafter SEXUAL AGGRESSION]; see also W.L. Marshall, A Revised Approach to
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Pharmacologic interventions also have shown promise, especially
antiandrogens, which reduce the production and effects of fhe male hor-
mone testosterone. Marshall concluded, for example, that the adjunctive
use of two such drugs, medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) and cyproter-
one acetate (CPA) is clearly beneficial for some patients."1 4 Paraphiliacs
have been a particular target of treatment with MPA, based on the belief
that decreasing their levels of testosterone will diminish the compulsive
sexual fantasies that lead them to commit sex crimes." '2 While initial
results have indicated substantial reductions in deviant sexual behavior
among paraphiliacs treated with MPA,2"6 much is still unknown about this
form of therapy, including its long-term impact on recidivism1 7 and why
its success varies dramatically among subjects.2 8 Further research must
explore these issues.
Although uncertainties exist and therapeutic advances have thus far
been modest in proportion to the problems attendant to sexual predation, the
foregoing belies the notion that sex offender treatments are hopelessly
ineffective. Continued improvement, however, will require the refinement
of present interventions and the introduction of comprehensive pharmaco-
logic and cognitive-behavioral regimens tailored to the needs of sex offend-
ers. The three-tiered plan forwarded by Marshall and his colleagues,
designed to transition sexual predators gradually into the community, is
illustrative of such an approach.2 9 States unwilling to invest the resources
the Treatment of Men Who Sexually Assault Adult Females, in SExUAL AGGRESSION, supra,
at 143, 156. Marshall and Pithers also criticize the tendency to measure efficacy exclusively
in terms of lower recidivism, arguing that delay in offense onset and reductions in the
number of victims are equally valid measures of therapeutic success. W.L. Marshall &
W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 10, 21-22 (1994).
214. Marshall et al., supra note 208, at 473-74.
215. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual
Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2-3 (1990).
216. Linda S. Grossman, Research Directions in the Evaluation and Treatment of Sex
Offenders:An Analysis, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 421, 435 (1985).
217. Id. at 426-29, 435-37.
218. Marshall et al., supra note 208, at 473.
219. W.L. Marshall et al., A Three-Tiered Approach to the Rehabilitation of Incarcer-
ated Sex Offenders, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 441 (1993). The protocol places offenders
initially in a maximum- or medium-security institution for six months with three hours of
daily group therapy and one to two hours of weekly individual therapy aimed at reducing
cognitive distortions and inappropriate attitudes and addressing issues relating to sexuality,
social competence, lifestyle, and relapse prevention. Id. at 447-48. After completing Tier
One, individuals are moved into a minimum-security facility where they focus on developing
a relapse prevention plan while continuing efforts to modify "inappropriate cognitive
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necessary to implement such comprehensive methodologies risk relying on
treatment approaches that may prove, down the road, to be insufficient to
justify the ongoing psychiatric commitment of sexual predators.
3. Impairments of Reason
Apart from any alleged problems of treatability, holding sexual preda-
tors in psychiatric institutions violates the notion forwarded by various
commentators that involuntary commitment is appropriate only for those
incompetent to make rational decisions about their care or treatment,M
which sexual predators typically are not. t Underlying this argument is the
concern that any further expansion in the scope of psychiatric confinement
exceeds the state's parens patriae justification. m This position fails, how-
ever, to sufficiently appreciate the state's corresponding imperative, under
its police power, "to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
of [those] who are mentally ill."' Where, as here, there is strong evidence
of an individual's propensity to engage in harmful sexual conduct, the
state's substantial interest in protecting society is particularly compelling
and justifies the use of a more inclusive standard of mental disease.
New Jersey's alteration of its definition of mental illness to facilitate
the commitment of sexual predators reflects the propriety of public safety
considerations in this context. Noting that psychiatrists had too often
required the presence of psychosis for commitment, lawmakers commented
that "the public [was] . . . denied the protection that the Legislature in-
processes." 1d. at 450-5 1. Following reentry into the community, Tier Three calls for
periodic re-evaluations of likelihood of reoffense, "external management" through a trained
parole officer, and further outpatient treatment, if necessary. Id. at 451-52.
220. See, e.g., Donald H.J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A
Critique of Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary
Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 100 (1986) (stating that commitment should be
limited to those who "lackl sufficient insight or capacity to make a rational decision
concerning treatment"); Schopp, supra note 163, at 176-77 (noting that legal mental illness
focuses on inability to "engag[e] in the deliberation required for [the] competent exercise
of the right to informed consent" to treatment); Winick, supra note 172, at 588 (explaining
that psychiatric detention requires individual that is "incompetent to make the hospitalization
decision for himself").
221. The paraphilias and personality disorders associated with sexual predation do not
require this sort of cognitive deficit. See supra note 220. Thus, the fact that "the instru-
mental rationality of sexual predators is entirely intact" will not preclude their commitment.
Morse, supra note 158, at 138; Winick, supra note 172, at 592 (asserting that sexual
psychopathy "does not produce cognitive or volitional incapacity").
222. See Hermann, supra note 220, at 100-02; Winick, supra note 172, at 588.
223. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
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tended to provide in enacting a law that calls for the involuntary civil
commitment of the dangerous mentally ill."224 In upholding the amended
language, the state supreme court rejected the argument that the state's
parenspatriae jurisdiction was invalid, noting the state's "powers to protect
the public welfare and to initiate civil commitment proceedings in the exer-
cise of [those powers]."'
Under the New Jersey approach, a sexual predator is "mentally ill" for
purposes of psychiatric commitment if he has an impaired capacity to
control behavior based on a "substantial disturbance" of perception or
orientation.' This is d sensible standard which recognizes that there need
not be a total deterioration of volition to justify involuntary detention,22 7
provided the state demonstrates that the functional impairment is linked to
a mental abnormality. Antisocial personality disorder, whose diagnostic
criteria include impulsivity, consistent irresponsibility, lack of remorse, and
aggressiveness (but not irrationality),' fits this behavioral profile, as do
paraphilias, which are characterized in part by deviant sexual urges or
behaviors. 9
224. Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 134, § 1(a), 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 542, 542 (West).
225. In re D.C., 679 A.2d 634, 644 (N.J. 1996). New Jersey derives its authority to
commit dangerous mentally ill persons for purposes of societal protection from both its
police and parenspatriae powers. Id. at 643-44; see Brooks, supra note 160, at 717 (noting
general jurisdiction and breadth of these powers in context of commitment of "mentally
disordered and dangerous persons"); cf. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referencing state's parenspatriae power "to protect and provide
for an ill individual").
226. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (Vest Supp. 1996).
227. As the court noted in Linehan, sexual predators that retain "a measure of self
control present an especially insidious risk, for they retain the ability to plan, wait, and
delay the indulgence of their maladies until presented with a higher probability of success."
In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 318 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
228. DSM-IV, supra note 162, at 649-50.
229. Id. at 522-23. States also provide, in other contexts, for the involuntary civil
commitment of sane persons who suffer no impairment of reason but pose a danger to
society. For example, various jurisdictions detain individuals who suffer from commu-
nicable diseases. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-11A-10, -18 (1990 & Supp. 1996) (tuber-
culosis and sexually transmitted diseases); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-650 (West
1989) (communicable diseases); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 505 (1995) (communicable
disease); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.28 (vest 1993 & Supp. 1996) (sexually transmissible
diseases); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-8 (1985) (infectious, communicable, or other disease
dangerous to public health); IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.5 (West 1989) (communicable dis-
eases); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.4180 (West 1989) (communicable diseases); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 141-C:11 (1996) (communicable diseases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145
(1995) (communicable diseases); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3707.08 (Anderson 1989)
(communicable diseases); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-104 (1992) (communicable or conta-
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It is not "perverse, "23 moreover, to subject individuals to civil deten-
tion based on a mental abnormality potentially leading to future sexual
misconduct when they were previously determined to be sufficiently respon-
sible to deserve criminal punishment for similar activity. 1  Just as the
conceptualization of mental illness may differ in clinical and legal con-
texts, 32 so too does its definition vary from one legal purpose to another.
For example, a mental disease or defect insufficient for trial incompetency
may well be adequate for the insanity defense. 3  By the same token,
exoneration from criminal guilt may legitimately require deficits in cogni-
tive and volitional capacities beyond what is necessary to vindicate the
regulatory interests of civil commitment.
V. Punishment Reconsidered
While increasingly common, psychiatric commitment is not the only
means of addressing the problem of sexual predation. Constitutional and
financial concerns 34 led Iowa, for example, to repeal the sexual predator
commitment law, enacted in 1995,2a5 before it went into effect. The legisla-
ture simultaneously replaced the statute with enhanced sentencing provisions
for "sexually predatory offenses. '"236 Under the new measures, repeat
offenders face escalating mandatory sanctions, ranging from a doubling of
gious diseases); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.06 (West Supp. 1995) (communicable diseases).
Chemically dependent persons are also commonly committed for the protection of the
public, as well as for their own health and safety. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 3000-3311 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-601 to -611 (1996);
MIsS. CODEANN. §§ 41-31-3, -5 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-52-5 to -210 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1995).
230. Morse, supra note 158, at 136.
231. The Model Penal Code specifies, in this regard, that "an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct" is insufficient evidence of mental
disease or defect to negate criminal responsibility. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1985).
Most jurisdictions whose nonresponsibility language tracks that of the Code have accepted
this caveat. Id. § 4.01 cmt. 5. See Emily Campbell, The Psychopath and the Definition of
"Mental Disease or Defect" Under the Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Question of
Psychology or a Question of Law?, 69 NEB. L. REV. 190, 221-28 (1990).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 161-64.
233. See Schopp, supra note 163, at 170-71.
234. Jonathan Roos, Sex Offender Measure is Approved by House, DES MOINEs REG.,
Apr. 3, 1996, at 5; Jonathan Roos, Bill Boosts Sex Predators' Penalties, DES MOiNES REG.,
Mar. 8, 1996, at 8.
235. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1-.12 (West 1996), repealed by IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 901A.1-.4 (West 1996).
236. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 901A.1-.4 (West 1996).
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the maximum possible sentence237 to life in prison.238 In 1995, Georgia and
Arkansas also augmented penalties for sex offenders, though not in as
dramatic a fashion as Iowa, a9 while Colorado has increased the presumptive
sentencing range for various sex offenses. m
Additionally, a number of states are considering "chemical castra-
tion"24 as a condition of parole.242 California has, in fact, recently enacted
a law permitting judges to order chemical castration for paroled persons
convicted of certain sex offenses against children under the age of thirteen
and requiring such judicial action upon conviction for a second similar
offense.243 Alternatively, under a bill currently pending in Alabama, the
court could sentence a male to chemical castration and a female to steriliza-
tion upon a second conviction for certain sex crimes involving children
under the age of sixteen.2' Pending legislation in Hawaii goes one step
237. Id. § 901A.2(1) (doubling maximum sentences for serious or aggravated misde-
meanors when there is prior conviction for sexually predatory offense).
238. Id. § 901A.2(4) (mandating life in prison for felony when there are two prior
convictions for sexually predatory offenses, at least one of which is also felony).
239. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-104 (Michie Supp. 1995) (upgrading crime of carnal
abuse in first degree from class "B" to class "A" felony); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-70(c),
16-6-4(a), (b) (Supp. 1995) (increasing minimum sentences for crimes of cruelty to children
and child molestation).
240. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105 (9.7) (Supp. 1995). Bills are currently pending
in New York and Illinois providing, respectively, for the creation of a new crime of
repeated carnal abuse of a child and the upgrading of criminal sexual assault from a class
"1" to a class "X" felony. See H.B. 1709, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ill.
1995); A.B. 5136, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
241. This procedure typically entails the administration of MCA, known also as "Depo-
Provera," or an equivalent treatment. See, e.g., H.B. 1744, 179th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann.
Sess., § 1 (Mass. 1995); H.B. 4703, 88th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess., § 12b(3) (Mich. 1995);
A.B. 594, 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess., § 8 (Wis. 1995); see also A.B. 3339, 1995-
96 Reg. Sess., § 2 (Cal. 1995) (enacted 1996).
242. See H.B. 1744, 179th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess., § 1 (Mass. 1995) (authorizing
pilot study into efficacy of chemical castration as condition of voluntary release for persons
convicted of rape or aggravated sexual battery); H.B. 4703, 88th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess.,
§ 12b(1) (Mich. 1995) (stating that upon second conviction for first degree sexual assault,
court may order chemical castration "during any portion of the sentence in which the person
is not incarcerated"); A.B. 594, 92d Leg. Sess., 1995-96 Reg. Sess., § 8 (Wis. 1995)
(asserting that chemical castration necessary for parole eligibility for certain defendants
convicted of sexually assaulting child less than twelve years old); cf. S.C.R. 56, 45th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 1996) (directing state board of corrections to provide for surgical
castration of any inmate in its custody by virtue of conviction for sex crime who requests
procedure).
243. A.B. 3339, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., § 2 (Cal. 1995) (enacted 1996).
244. H.B. 92, 1996 Reg. Sess., § 2(a) (Ala. 1996).
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further, mandating chemical or physical castration for certain persons
convicted of sexual assault.245 While the future of these legislative propos-
als is unclear, the constitutionality of a court's authority to order castration
or sterilization is open to serious question.
Notwithstanding these extreme proposals, those who doubt the sincerity
of states' interest in psychiatrically treating sexual predators generally
prefer augmenting criminal punishment to civil detention.' Enhancements
in the length of criminal sentences are, moreover, virtually unimpeachable
constitutionally, given the tenuousness of proportionality review. 47 How-
ever, the fact that states enjoy such latitude in defining appropriate punish-
ment introduces the possibility that fear of recidivism, as opposed to moral
blameworthiness, will determine the sentence.' Where mentally impaired
individuals are concerned, these predictions of dangerousness perhaps are
better left to the civil law and the detention it prescribes.49
Conclusion
Sexual predation is a particularly noxious and fearsome public prob-
lem. Though citizens may, under Megan's Laws, receive notice that a
released sex offender is about to move in next door, they cannot stop the
offender's arrival into the neighborhood. Only mandatory life sentences for
all crimes of sexual violence or indefinite civil commitment can keep
predators off the streets. This Article has examined the latter option,
adopted by an increasing number of states over the last few years.
245. S.B. 1249, 18th Leg., § 2 (Haw. 1995).
246. See, e.g:, Beth Keiko Fujimoto, Sexual Violence, Sanity and Safety: Constitutional
Parameters for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 879, 911 (1992); Horwitz, supra note 159, at 67-68; Reardon, supra note 161, at 851;
Stone, supra note 206, at 192-94.
247. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (stating that mandating
life sentence for possession of 650 grams or more of drug does not violate Eighth Amend-
ment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (stating that punishing jurisdiction
has discretion to determine mechanics of recidivist statutes and punishment thereunder). But
see Coker v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 584, 592 n.4 (1977) (noting that death is "a dispropor-
tionate punishment" for rape).
248. 'This is of particular concern here, where conclusive evidence that sexual predators
are more likely to recidivate than other violent offenders is lacking. See, e.g., Stuart Schein-
gold et al., The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual PredatorLegisla-
tion, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809, 812-13 (1992) (reviewing recidivism studies).
249. By providing separate proceedings wherein future dangerousness is considered,
modem sexual predator statutes foster distinctions between criminal punishment and regu-
latory detention. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction
and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993).
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I have argued that current sexual predator statutes are constitutional in
virtually all respects. Although states cannot warehouse sexual predators
in the back wards of psychiatric hospitals without violating substantive due
process, government officials need not demonstrate an individual's inability
to reason in order to justify psychiatric detention. Neither must states
prove that the therapeutic intervention provided is more likely than not to
cure an individual's pathology. Clinicians must instead achieve an accept-
able level of treatment success over a period of years. In determining
"acceptability," courts should take account of prior treatment success or
lack thereof.
Clearly, psychiatrists play an important role in this process. By the
same token, differences in the application of mental illness in the clinical
and legal contexts limit the extent to which one conceptual framework can
and should borrow from the other. While the medical community is a
useful adjunct, only the legislatures are invested with both parens patriae
and police powers, which operate jointly to define the scope of permissible
psychiatric commitment. Subject to the foregoing conditions, there is an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the inclusion of sexual predators
within this definition.
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